Kamis, November 28

11th Postgraduate Certificate in Corruption Studies – November 2013



Research study: The anti-corruption environment in Timor-Leste

Brief background of the political, economic and social environment of Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste is located on the southernmost edge of the Indonesian Archipelago. After some 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule and 24 years of resistance against Indonesian occupation, Timor-Leste gained independence in 1999. At the time of independence, 80% of the infrastructure was laid waste. Given the dire lack of institutions and capacity, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) administered the country, exercised legislative and executive authority and supported capacity-building to usher in self-government. Full authority was handed over to the first constitutional government in 2002. Timor-Leste is a parliamentary democracy in which the President is Head of State and the Prime Minister is Head of Government. The President serves a five-year term and is directly elected; he or she appoints the leader of the majority party in parliament as Prime Minister.
Timor-Leste’s population is 1.21 million, with a more than 60% aged under 16. Portuguese influence during centuries of colonial rule resulted in a substantial majority of the population identifying themselves as Roman Catholic. Portuguese and Tetun are the official languages, with English and Bahasa Indonesian as working languages. [1]
After restoration of independence on May 20, 2002, Timor-Leste continued to face many challenges in all areas. The government sees its main focus as balancing the pace of social and economic development while responding to the complex needs of its population. Two of the most pressing priorities continue to be security reform and economic development, but the government also recognizes that more needs to be done in areas of social justice, welfare and service delivery most particularly for rural populations and in combating corruption.
While agriculture (e.g. coffee) has traditionally been the backbone of the economy, oil and gas are now the major export earners. The country has been noted for its sandalwood and teak production for centuries and for its marble resources.
The country’s GDP for 2012 was $1.3 billion, with GDP per capita for the same period: $9500.[2]

The anti-corruption legal framework

The issue of combating and preventing corruption has been emphasized since the UNTAET administration and is included in several legal codes:
o   Articles 292 to 299 of the Penal Code define corruption; the definition was adopted by the Anti-Corruption Commission law;
o   Article 10.4 of the Civil Service Law covers actions in the case of a civil servant suspected of committing corruption, fraud, embezzlement or taking public properties or money;
o   The national parliament ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) on 10 December 2008 and subsequently approved the Law on the Anti-Corruption Commission on 29 June 2009.
o   Witness Protection Decree Law
o   Criminal Procedure Code
o   Money Laundering Law

The anti-corruption institutional framework:

Ø  Anti-Corruption Agency
In 2000, UNTAET established an agency of government to control and audit the misuse of government administration and finances. The first government of Timor-Leste created the Inspesaum Jerál (IGE) with those same responsibilities. Law No. 7, 2004, Article 23 PDHJ (Ombudsman of Human Right and Justice) with the mission to: oversee good government; promote human rights and combat and prevent corruption.
Following enactment of the Law on the Anti-Corruption Commission, (Law No. 8, 2009), (see Attachment) Parliament elected the first Commissioner of the Anti-Corruption Commission (Comissão Anti-Corrupção - CAC) in February 2010. By December 2010, CAC had recruited staff to functional capacity. The responsibilities and functions of PDHJ regarding anti-corruption were extended to CAC in 2010.
CAC is a legal entity governed by public law; CAC has technical independence and administrative and financial authority
·         Enforcement capability

To improve capacity of CAC human resources, there are two ways: the first is external/abroad training and the second is internal  training. The first  includes  course study of Internal Auditing in Jakarta, Indonesia, Comparative Study in Bhutan, Hong Kong, Bangkok,  training about investigation of corruption’s crime in Singapore, participation in workshops of International Women to fight corruption  in Jakarta and Australia. And also to get the Post Graduate Certificate in Corruption Studies in Hong Kong is considered as a part of improving CAC’s human resources capability.
And the second is: PETS and QSDS training which are handled by UNDP Timor-Leste,  Training about “Capture author of crime” which is taught  by  the National Police of Timor-Leste,  attending combat and prevention corruption training  which is handled by FOTI USAID and CASALS and associate. English and Portuguese language courses which are taught by LELI and Portuguese Institution.

·         Independence
Article 3 of the Law on the Anti-Corruption Commission established the CAC as “a legal person governed by public law, given a legal personality with technical independence and administrative and financial autonomy”.
Adequacy of resources
Article 29 of the Law on the Anti-Corruption Commission (see Attachment) sets out CAC’s financial independence.
CAC submits a coasted annual Action Plan to Parliament for approval. The plan is initially evaluated by the Ministry of Finance and then considered by the Council of Ministers. While Parliament usually gives approval to the cost Action Plan, funding, when approved, is made available to CAC.  Although CAC’s  law guarantees  financial help to CAC however the current budget of CAC is still very centralized by the Ministry of Finance, therefore sometimes  it can  affect  the daily  activities of CAC  with every little thing  having to be lodged  to Finance in order to get approval.
CAC’s operations are limited by a lack of human resources. As a recently-established organization, the available pool of potential recruits with relevant skills and experience is limited, e.g., in technical areas including:
o   forensic construction
o   education
o   information technology
o   prevention


o   forensic accounting
o   money laundering
o   undercover investigation
o   procurement

CAC recognizes the need to work with similar international agencies to increase its human resource capacity.
·         Statutory power
The powers of the Commission are set out in Article 5 of the Law on the Anti-Corruption Commission, and cover the areas of criminal prevention and criminal investigation.
·         Jurisdiction
CAC’s jurisdiction covers:
o   all members of government, including the President and the Prime Minister;
o   the judiciary;
o   the operations and staff of the public sector;
o   government-funded projects in the private sector
o   All citizens of Timor-Leste.
Ø  Prosecution authority
CAC undertakes investigations at the request, and under the authorization (Article 48 of the Criminal Procedure Code) of the Public Prosecutor, a body established by the Constitution of Timor-Leste (Article 132; see Attachment).  The final reports of investigations are submitted to the Prosecutor.  There are two ways of conducting an investigation: the first is active investigation and the second is passive investigation.
Limitations on capability exist because only eight prosecutors in the whole of Timor-Leste deal with corruption, as well as a range of other cases.
Ø  Judiciary and its effectiveness
Timor-Leste’s judicial framework comprises:
o   the District Court as the Court of First Instance; (There are 4 in Timor-Leste)
o   the Court of Appeal
The effectiveness of the judiciary is limited by the available of suitable human resources for recruitment to the role. The current judiciary, for example, does not have specific training regarding anti-corruption matters.



System framework

Ø  Civil Service system in preventing corruption
The Civil Service Commission was established in 2009 by the Law on Creation of the Civil Service Commission. A publication produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development[3], however, notes the lack of either inclusion or awareness of several important anti-corruption elements which fit within the Civil Service system: Freedom of information; Asset disclosure; Conflicts of interests; Code of ethics; Whistleblower protection; Public participation. 
Ø  Public procurement practices
Procurement is involved in over 70 percent of all government expenditure; hence there is considerable risk of misuse or an inability to properly account for a substantial proportion of government expenditure. Decree Law No. 10, 2005 established a system of government procurement. To consolidate, simplify and clarify the previous plethora of procurement decree laws, the Council of Ministers passed the Procurement Decree Law of 2011 which established the National Procurement Commission.
Ministers have delegation to approve contracts entered into by their departments to of a value of up to $1,000,000. Special conditions apply to projects worth above that amount which must be considered by the National Procurement Commission which reports direct to the Prime Minister.
Ø  Civil Society Organizations’ role
Given the characteristics of the country and its creation, Timor-Leste hosts a high number of local and international non-government organizations (NGOs). Generally, NGOs have their own anti-corruption strategies and CAC endeavors to work in partnership with the NGO systems.
Ø  Media’s role
A draft media law is presently being prepared; journalists were consulted regarding its content.
The involvement of the media in the prevention of corruption is important. While CAC involves the media as a strategy to prevent corruption, it is not currently being used at maximum potential.

Special features, successful reform and best practices

CAC has designed and implemented a range of activities used on International Anti-Corruption Day each year as a means of educating and uniting young people. These include:
o   an essay competition for university students on the topic of how to combat and prevent corruption;
o   a competitive quiz for junior and senior high school students about anti-corruption methods, including combating and preventing corruption;
o   A football league competition.
CAC is pleased with the effectiveness of these strategies as a way of supporting a culture of anti-corruption in its younger generation of citizens.

ATTACHMENT
1.   CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF EAST TIMOR
CHAPTER II
PUBLIC PROSECUTION
Section 132
(Functions and Status)
1. Public Prosecutors have the responsibility for representing the State, prosecuting, Ensuring the defense of the underage, absentees and the disabled, defending the Democratic legality and promoting the enforcement of the law.
2. Public Prosecutors shall be a body of judicial officers, hierarchically graded, and shall be accountable to the Prosecutor-General.
3. In performing their duties, Public Prosecutors shall be subject to legality, objectivity and impartiality criteria, and obedience toward directives and orders as established by Law.
4. Public Prosecutors shall be governed by their own statutes, and shall only be suspended, retired or dismissed under the circumstances provided for in the law.
5. It is incumbent upon the Office of the Prosecutor-General to appoint, assign, and transfer and promote public prosecutors and exercise disciplinary actions.

2.      DECREE-LAW No. 13/2005
OF
THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
CHAPTER IV
ON THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE
Article 48
Responsibilities of the Public Prosecution Service
1.      The Public Prosecution Service is the holder of the criminal action and it is incumbent upon it to cooperate with the court in disclosing the truth and in applying the rule of law by complying, in every procedural intervention, with strict criteria of legality and objectivity.
2.      It is specifically incumbent upon the Public Prosecution Service to:
(a) Receive claims, complaints and reports and order the initiation of criminal proceedings, once the requirements for legitimacy have been met;
(b) Conduct the enquiry and take over the procedures it deems advisable to conduct directly in this phase;
(c) Request the intervention of the judge in performing jurisdictional acts during the enquiry;
(d) Present the indictment and sustain it in court;
(e) Lodge appeals;
(f) Promote the execution of court decisions;
(g) Perform such other acts the law considers to be under its competencies.
LAW ON THE ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION
LAW Nº. 8/2009, July 15

Article 3
Nature of the Commission
1.      The Commission is a legal person governed by public law, given a legal personality with technical independence and administrative and financial autonomy.
2.      The Commission is given the status of an independent, specialized criminal police body and its intervention is governed by criteria of strict legality and objectivity, in accordance with the terms of the law.
3.      In its capacity as criminal police body, the Commission shall act under the responsibility of the competent judicial authority under the terms of the law.

Article 5
Powers of the Commission
1.      In terms of criminal prevention the Commission has the power to:
a) Gather and analyze information on the causes and the prevention of corruption;
b) Undertake awareness raising actions aimed at limiting the practice of acts of corruption, by motivating people to adopt precautions or to reduce those acts and situations which render the occurrence of criminal conduct easier;
c) Advise any institution or public authority on ways to prevent and fight against corrupt conduct.
2.      In terms of criminal investigation, the Commission has the power to exercise the duties assigned under the terms of the law to the criminal police bodies, notably,
a) To conduct the inquiry or practice acts of inquiry delegated to it by the Public Prosecutor's Office;
b) To gather news of crimes;
c) To discover those agents responsible for practicing criminal acts;
d) To investigate signs or news of facts this may constitute a crime;
e) To proceed to the identification and detention of people;
f) To make the necessary notifications by itself or by resorting to another police authority;
g) To conduct interrogations within the scope of the investigation and other investigative measures necessary for the performance of their duties;
h) To conduct searches and body searches;
i) To seize objects and documents;
j) To stand on watch;
k) To intercept and record conversations or telephone calls, with a court order;
l) To examine books, documents, records, archives and other pertinent elements in the possession of the entities which are under investigation, as well as other pending offences;
m) To draw up expert reports, take measurements and gather samples for laboratory exams;
n) To seal off premises.
3.      In terms of criminal investigation, the Commission may also suggest to the public Prosecutor's Office that precautionary measures be adopted under the terms of the applicable penal procedural legislation, notably:
a) That an order be made to freeze bank accounts when there are strong indications that they contain funds resulting from crimes as set out in article 4;
b) That an order be made that any assets in the possession, custody or control of a person are not to be used;
4.      In order to fulfill its respective duties, the Commission shall give maximum priority to the investigation of those cases of corruption of greater severity or complexity.
5.      The special regimes set out in Decrees-Law No. 4/2006 of 1st March and No. 2/2007 of 8th March shall be applicable to the Commission.
6.      Acts carried out by the Commission without a court order from the competent judicial authorities, under the terms set out in the law, shall be validated by the competent judicial authority within a maximum time limit of 72 hours, under penalty of it being rendered null and void.
7.      The validation shall be requested with urgency by the Public Prosecutor's Office.
CHAPTER VI
BUDGET
 Article 29 Budget
1.      The Commission shall have a yearly budget sufficient to cover its operational costs and adequate to maintain its independence, impartiality and efficiency, as set out under the terms of the law.
2.      The Commission budget shall be prepared, approved and managed in accordance with the law.
3.      The Commission shall be forbidden from receiving funds from other sources.
4.      The Commission shall keep accounting records and other records on its functions or activities.
5.      The financial statements shall be presented to the National Parliament and audited by the High Court of Administration, Taxation and Accounting or by independent external auditors.


[1]Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Article 13
[3] Corruption Assessment: Timor-Leste. 15 September 2009

Selasa, November 26

BHUTAN, NIGERIA, AND TIMOR- LESTE: A COMPARISON OF ANTI CORRUPTION STRATEGIES

I.                    INTRODUCTION  
Corruption and the concomitant strategies to combat it are products of failed institutions and of a disarticulated and dysfunctional national political economy. Corruption therefore, is not the cause of underdevelopment and poverty in underdeveloped nations, rather it is the political economy of underdevelopment that creates and promotes corruption[1]
The anti-corruption strategies of Timor-Leste, Bhutan and Nigeria are better understood within the context and dynamics of their history, institutional development and socio-political economy.
Timor-Leste and Bhutan are small Asian countries with a population of 1.2 million and 0.75 million people respectively. Nigeria is in the West coast of Africa with an estimated population of over 165 million people. It has the status of the 7th most populous nation in the world. Both Nigeria and Timor-Leste were former colonies of Britain and Portuguese respectively.[2]
For the two former colonies the logic and contours of their contemporary underdevelopment and poverty, and the conditions of corruption had been established and entrenched by the nature of colonial rule’s exclusive political institutions and extractive economy. Bhutan is among the few nations in the world lucky to have escaped colonization or foreign occupation, and is, therefore in better position more than Nigeria and Timor-Leste to achieve leadership consensus capable of organizing inclusive political and economic institutions that can combat corruption and achieve rapid economic development.[3]
The three countries practice some variation and systems of democratic governance. For example, Nigeria operates a presidential system of government. The kingdom of Bhutan operates democratic constitutional monarchy while Timor-Leste is a semi-president.
In terms of the structure of their economies the three countries are market oriented economy, commodity and raw material export dependent and predominantly agricultural based. Nigeria with a fast growing manufacturing sector and a sizeable share of world oil and gas export is the third largest economy in Africa behind South Africa and Egypt, and ranked 30th in GDP in the world. Timor-Leste in addition to her thriving coffee export derives substantial revenue from oil and gas. Bhutan national revenue comes largely from hydroelectricity and tourism.[4]
As middle income and developing economies the three countries are confronted with issues of public sector corruption. Nigeria and Bhutan have put in place appropriate legislation and anti-corruption agencies to combat corruption. Timor-Leste has established anti corruption agency but still in the process of enacting appropriate anti-corruption legislation.
II.                  POLITICAL WILL
The capacity of a country to combat corruption depends largely on the political will of its government and national political leadership. For Bhutan, Timor-Leste and Nigeria the degree of the political willingness of both their governments and national leaders can be examined against the independence and autonomy accorded their respective anti corruption agencies, the level of funding provided the appropriateness and efficacy of extant anti corruption legislations, and the security of tenure of head of anti-corruption agencies.



  1. Independence of ACA
Bhutan
The constitution of the kingdom of Bhutan accorded its ACA some degree of independence but has no power over the recruitment and selection of its staff. Under the Bhutan Civil Service Rules 2011(BCSR) the power to employ and recruit staff for all government agencies is vested in the Civil Service Commission. The ACC like Nigeria’s CCB was established primarily to investigate public officials. It has no power to investigate the private sector. The ACC has two Commissioners and a Chairman appointed by the King but can only be removed by parliament through impeachment. The Commission reports to the Parliament and also to the king. The appointment is for a 5year term renewable for another term of five years until the retirement age of 65 years.[5]
Nigeria
The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) of Nigeria is an independent body guaranteed by the constitution. Unlike Bhutan’s ACC the CCB is autonomous and poses executive powers in all matters relating to investigation, prosecution and personnel matters. The activities of CCB can only be over sighted by parliament. The Chairman and Federal Commissioners of CCB are appointed by the President and screened and confirmed by the parliament. Once confirmed by parliament the President cannot remove them from office except by impeachment by the parliament. The appointment is for a 5year term renewable for another term of five years until the retirement age of 70 years. [6]
Timor-Leste
Unlike Bhutan and Nigeria, the Anti-corruption Commission of Timor-Leste is governed by public law. The commission is independent of the president but it’s over sighted by the parliament to which it must submit and present its reports and annual activities. The head of the anti-corruption commission is appointed by the parliament for a term of four years renewable only once, for an equal period of time. But as per the Article 12 of Establishment Law No.8/2009 the Commissioner has the authority to appoint at least three Deputy Commissioners.[7]
  1. Adequacy of Resources
Bhutan
The ACC of Bhutan depends on parliament for its funding and from donations it receives from donor agencies like Swiss Development Bank (SDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank, which constitutes significant portion of its annual budget. The ACC is constrained and it’s anti corruption work substantially impeded for lack of adequate financial and human resources.  Parliament approved Nu. 99.5million to ACC that is almost double than what has been proposed, ACC has proposed Nu 51 million. [8]  
Nigeria
Nigeria’s CCB is fully funded by the government subject to parliamentary approval. The level of funding is fairly adequate, so is the level of human resources available to CCB to carry out its constitutional mandate.
Timor-Leste
Contrary to the practice in Bhutan and Nigeria Timor-Leste receives its budget on a monthly basis from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) subject to the approval of the parliament. Thus by implication this gives the MoF power to control the work program of the agency by controlling the flow of resources. The commission is also constraints by the lack of human resources.
III.                LAW
A country’s constitution and anti corruption legislation provides the principles and legal framework, as well as the impetus for fighting corruption. The following are the relevant features of constitutional and anti corruption legislation of Bhutan, Timor-Leste and Nigeria:
A.     Legal Framework
Nigeria
Bhutan
Timor-Leste
1.       Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and the Code of Conduct and Tribunal Act, 1990 empowers the Code of Conduct Bureau to enforce the code of conduct for all public officials and the power of prevention, investigation and prosecution of any public official that breach anti corruption provisions of the constitution.
2.       The constitution empowers the Code of Conduct Bureau to administer Asset Declaration Forms on all public officials. And use the information contain in the asset declaration to monitor the behavior and conduct of   public officials.  

1.       The Constitution of Bhutan-Legal basis for the establishment of ACC
2.       The Anti-Corruption Act, 2011
3.       The Audit Act, 2006;
4.       The Penal code, procedure penal code and   civil law
5.       The Financial Service Act, 2011;
6.       The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic and substance Abuse Act, 2005
7.       Civil service rules and regulations 2011 and the procurement rules 2008
8.       Financial Institutional Act, 2007;
9.       The Election Act of Bhutan, 2008
10.   The Anti-Money laundering law and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Regulation, 2010;
11.   Asset declaration Rules, 2008

1.       The law on Establishment ACC no.8/2009
2.       Penal Code and  Criminal Procedure Code
3.       The National Parliament Ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) on 10 December 2008.
4.       Code of Conduct
5.       The Constitution Guarantee  Supremacy of Law and Good Governance
6.       Procurement Decree Law no.10/2005 established a system of government. To consolidate, simplify and clarify the previous plethora of procurement decree laws, the Council of Ministers passed the Procurement Decree Law of 2011 which established the National Procurement Commission
7.       Money Laundering Law
8.       Witness Protection Decree Law
9.       Civil Service Commission Law no. 8/2004
10.   Decree Law on Portal Transparency: E-state Budget and its performances, e procurement
11.   Draft Anti-Corruption Law and Draft Asset Declaration Law still processing in Parliament

  1. Intercept evidences
Bhutan
Bhutan has the subpoena power to obtain documentation, information, testimonies or other evidence. It also has the power to take sample hand writing and voice
Nigeria
CCB has the power to use intercept evidence such as obtaining information and sample handwriting and voice.


Timor-Leste
Unlike Bhutan and Nigeria it has no power to obtain intercept evidence and if need be they have to get the court warrant in obtaining information and taking sample hand writing and voice.
  1. Prosecution authority
Bhutan
Generally, ACC has no prosecution power however, after the investigation of a case and the review of the report, section (128) (3) of the ACA gives discretionary power for commission to carry out prosecution its own or take prosecution process from the office of the Attorney General when the case is delayed without valid reason or manipulated or hampered with influence.
Nigeria
Like ACC in Bhutan CCB don’t have the authority to prosecute the case and the case is prosecuted by the Attorney General.
Timor-Leste
ACC don’t have the authority to prosecute the case however based on the Article 132 of the Constitutional Law and Article 48 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides authority of the Attorney General to prosecute the case.
  1. Management Conflict of Interest
Bhutan
Bhutan has a formal system of declaration of conflict of interest to which every public official must subscribe. They are of two types: positive and negative declaration.


Nigeria
The Code of Conduct for public officials has specific provisions relating to Conflict of Interest. Section 5 of the provisions provides as follows: ‘A Public Officer shall not put himself in a position where his personal interest conflicts with his duties and responsibilities’. [9]

The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) has the power to investigate and prosecute cases of Conflict of Interest among Public Officers. There are no formal conflicts of interest handling mechanisms within CCB as it exists in Bhutan’s ACC.
Timor-Leste
There is no code of ethics and law governing conflict of interest in Timor-Leste. However, the provision has been included in Civil Service Law No. 8/2004 and the Procurement Law No.10/2005 and also specifically mentioned in the draft anti-corruption law currently before parliament.[10]

E.      Whistle Blower and Witness Protection
Bhutan
There is no whistle blower and witness protection program in Bhutan even though the Anti-corruption Act, 2012, chapter 7 provides for whistle blowers and witnesses protection.[11]
Nigeria
There is no whistle blower and witness protection act in CCB provisions.
Timor-Leste
Timor-Leste has the Witness Protection Law (No.9/2009) and provisions regarding whistle blower protection are defined in the Penal Code Decree Law No.19/2009.[12]

  1. Asset Declaration System
Bhutan
In Bhutan, a Public servant whose position is above grade 8 or equivalent to P5 as per the BCSR, 2011, must declare their asset, income and liabilities. But those civil servants who are in vulnerable position must declare their asset irrespective of their grade.  Asset declaration system in Bhutan checks the accountability and transparency of a public servant. After the declaration of asset by the public servant ACC will examine the declaration and take appropriate action.[13]
Nigeria
In Nigeria, public servants must declare their asset, income and liabilities. Every public servant is required to declare his or her asset on assumption of office, every four years thereafter and at the end of his/her tenure. All asset declarations are required to be verified by CCB and any breach may be prosecuted at the tribunal.
Timor-Leste
Timor-Leste does not have asset declaration system.
  1. Judiciary Effectiveness
Bhutan
The Judiciary is very effective in the handling and prosecution of corruption cases. The judiciary is said to be the cleanest in the world.
Nigeria
The CCB has its own special court known as the CODE OF CONDUCT TRIBUNAL (CCT).  The tribunal is headed by a panel of three judges who adjudicate on all cases brought before it by the CCB. The powers of the CCT and the punishment it can impose on various offenses are stipulated in the constitution. The CCT is fairly effective.
Timor-Leste
The effectiveness of the judiciary is limited by the availability of human resource and lack of adequate and relevant training on corruption legislation.  
IV.               BEST PRACTICES AND INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM
Bhutan
ACC of Bhutan has recently adapted a robust prevention tool known as Integrity Diagnostic Tool (IDT). It aims at assessing the health of government ministries and departments and provides blue prints for diagnosing integrity lapses and corruption.
Bhutan has also put in place one of the National Integrity Strategy (NIS) that provides broad guidelines for combating corruption. It has been institutionalized in the management system of government organization and departments.[14]
Nigeria
Nigeria has recently launched a National Anti-corruption Strategy (NACS) that is intended to incorporate the best practices around the world. A joint committee of ACAs in Nigeria is working out the details.
Timor-Leste
The anti-corruption agency has designed a range of policies to conform with anti-corruption practices in other countries and these are still before parliament for approval.


V.                 CONCLUSION
The above brief comparative examination of the anti-corruption agencies of Bhutan, Nigeria and Timor-Leste show the strengths and weaknesses of their anti-corruption Institutional framework, the efficiency of their legislation and judicial system in combating corruption. The study also shows that while the three countries are committed to fighting corruption their approaches, strategies and capabilities differ. This is our opinion and is determined by social, political and economic environment of each country.
The group is of the opinion that in spite of the various challenges facing by the three countries in the difficult task of fighting corruption they are making progress.

VI.               RECOMMENDATION
On the basis of our study of the anti-corruption agencies of Bhutan, Timor-Leste and Nigeria we wish to suggest the following policy recommendations as a way of strengthening the three countries anti-corruption efforts:
-          Three countries suffered from inadequate financial resources to prosecute viable and sustainable anti-corruption program. We suggest better funding which can only be improved if the political leadership is committed to the fight against corruption.
-          Nigeria’s CCB and Timor-Leste ACA appear skewed towards more investigation. They need to balance their work by focusing on prevention activities and prosecution.
-           Nigeria’s CCB and Timor-Leste ACA have no integrity assessment system. There is need for the two countries to put integrity system in place.
-          Bhutan and Nigeria need to propose and established the whistle blower and witness protection law. It is recommended that this be put in place to strengthen the willingness of citizens to report corruption.
-          Nigeria and Timor-Leste have no formal system of Declaring Conflict of Interest. This is crucial in anti-corruption work. The two countries should emulate Bhutan and put effective conflict of interest declaration system in place.
-          There is disparity and salary differential among the staff of the Anti-corruption agencies of Bhutan and Timor-Leste. This is not good for morale. We recommend that a uniform salary structure be put in place in the two countries.
-          Timor-Leste does not have Asset Declaration system. This is an important instrument for monitoring public officials and for investigating public sector corruption. We suggest Timor-Leste establish asset declaration regime.
-          Nigeria’s code of conduct tribunal and the judiciary in Timor-Leste need to be further strengthened and made more effective in the prosecution of corruption cases.
-          Bhutan’s systems of reliance on the civil service commission for recruitment of staff compromise its independence. We suggest the ACC should have the independence to recruit and manage its human resources.
-          Timor-Leste has anti-corruption agency without anti-corruption legislation. This limits the effectiveness of the agency. We recommend an anti-corruption legislation be put in place to strengthen the agency’s work.  










VII.             REFERENCE
Acemoglu, Daron, and Robison and James (2012). Why Nations Fall: The Origin of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London
Anti-corruption Commission Act (2009). Established ACC Law. Retrieved from www.jurnal.gov.tl on 22nd November, 2013
Anti-Corruption Commission Act (2011). Anti-corruption Act (2011), ACC: Thimphu
Anti-Corruption Commission (2012). Asset Declaration Rule (2012) ACC: Thimphu
Anti-Corruption Commission (2012). Annual Report 2012, ACC: Thimphu
Anti-corruption Commission (2011).  Institutional Development Plan 2011-2020. ACC: Bhutan
Bhutan Anti-corruption Act, 2011; Timor-Leste Penal Code of No.19/2009.
See Khan Mushtag in Rose-Ackerman and Susan (ed. P.214-216). Determinants of Corruption in Developing countries: The limits of conventional economic analysis. Edward Elgar Publishers: Chelten
Nigerian Constitution (1999), section 153
Nigeria Constitution (1999); the code of conduct and tribunal act, 1990; Bhutan constitution;
Nigerian constitutions (1999), Fourth schedule
Nigerian constitution (1999), ibid
Wikipedia encyclopedia, ibid
Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia. Bhutan, Timor-Leste and Nigeria (2013).
Wangmo, C. (2013). Finance Minister Presents 2013-2014 budget outlay.    Bhutan Observer.



[1] See Khan Mushtag, “Determinants of Corruption in Developing countries: The limits of conventional economic analysis” in Rose-Ackerman, Susan (ed) INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, Chelten; Edward Elgar Publishers 2006 (PP. 216-214)
[2] Bhutan, Timor-Leste and Nigeria (2013). Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia,
[3] Acemoglu, Daron, and Robison, James, WHY NATNS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY AND POVERTY, London: Profile Books 2012 (chapter2)
[4] ibid
[5] ACC Institutional Development Plan 2011-2020(unpublished)
[6] Nigerian Constitution (1999), section 153
[7] Anti-corruption Commission Act (2009). Established ACC Law. Retrieved from www.jurnal.gov.tl on 22nd November, 2013
[9] Nigerian constitutions (1999), Fourth schedule
[10] Civil Service Law No. 8/2004 and the Procurement Law No.10/2005
[11] Anti-Corruption Commission, (2011). Anti-corruption Act, ACC: Thimphu
[12] Penal code degree law No. 19/2009 and witness protection law No. 9/2009.
[13] Nigerian constitution (1999), ibid
[14] Anti-Corruption Commission (2012). Annual Report 2012, ACC: Thimphu